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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This is an Appeal from an Order dated March 9, 1992,
issued by the Honorable Gordon J. Low, First District for Cache
County, State of Utah. Although this appeal was originally filed
by Appellant with the Utah Supreme Court which had original
jurisdiction, that Court assigned the case to the Utah Court of
Appeals. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(J) (1991) and Rule 3 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The only issue presented for this Court to decide is
whether or not there was substantial evidence to support the Order
issued by the First District Court in this matter. In determining
that issue, three (3) subsidiary issues are presented.
(1)

They are:

Is the Appellant limited to arguing on appeal only

those issues identified in his Docketing Statement;
(2) Did the Trial Court properly calculate Appellant's
right to the proceeds from the sale of joint property and correctly
offset that amount against Appellee's alimony arrearages; and,
(3) What is the proper rate of prejudgment interest to
be applied on the alimony arrearages.
In domestic relation matters, Trial Courts are afforded
broad discretion as long as that discretion is exercised within the
confines of legal precedence.

Whitehead v. Whiteheadf 193 Utah
1

Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (Utah App. 1992), Cumminas v. Cumminas, 821 P.2d
472, 474-75 (Utah App. 1991).

The Appellate Court must afford the

Trial Court "considerable latitude in adjusting financial and
property interests, and its actions are entitled to a presumption
of validity."
1988).

Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah App.

The Appellate Court must presume the correctness of the

trial Court's decision absent "manifest injustice or inequity that
indicates a clear abuse of ... discretion." Hansen v. Hansen, 736
P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah App. 1987).
In order to successfully challenge the Trial Court's
Findings, the Appellant is required to marshall all the evidence
supporting the Court's Finding and demonstrate that the evidence is
insufficient to support that Finding.

Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700

P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE/RULE
Utah Code Annotated, Section 15-1-1(2) (1989), Revised
Code of Washington, Section 19.52.010 (1) and Rule 9 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure are applicable to the resolution of
this matter. Those statutes and rules are set forth verbatim were
applicable.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case.
This is an appeal from an Order issued by the First
District Court in the above matter, vitiating all interest, equity
2

or claim Appellant had in the equity of a certain parcel of real
property located in Logan, Utah and, after offsetting said equity,
awarding Appellee judgment in the sum of $16, 886.54 for unpaid
alimony.
Course of Proceedings.
Plaintiff/Appellant filed his Complaint against Defendant/Appellee seeking payment of the "net proceeds" from the sale
of the parties home. Defendant/Appellee counterclaimed for unpaid
alimony arrearages. Trial was held on December 17, 1991.
Disposition Below.
The Honorable Gordon J. Low of the First Judicial
District Court of Cache County, State of Utah after trial found
that at the time of the sale of the real property under a real
estate contract, with installment payments, that the Plaintiff/
Appellant equity would at maximum be $33,000.00. (R. at 392).

The

Court further found that the Plaintiff/Appellant was in arrears in
his alimony obligation and that even after those arrears were
offset by his interest in the real property that there was still a
balance owing to the Defendant/Appellee in the sum of $16,886.54.
(R.

at

356).

The

Court

applied

the

Washington

statutory

prejudgment interest rate of 12% in it's calculation of the alimony
arrearages. (T. at 83).
Plaintiff/Appellant appealed and the Defendant/Appellee
petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for Summary Disposition.
3

The

Utah Supreme Court ordered that the case be "poured over" to the
Utah Court of Appeals* The Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Summary Disposition.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The parties were divorced on or about the 20th day of
October, 1980 pursuant to a Decree of Dissolution issued by the
Superior Court of Washington for King County. (R. at 86-87, copy
attached to Addendum as Exhibit A ) .

The Decree provided in

relevant part as follows:
The home located in Logan, Utah which
home should be sold and after payment of
closing costs and mortgage payment, the
proceeds divided egually between petitioner
and respondent. Each party should be reguired
to bear any capital gains that may be
occasioned proportionally with all respected
proceeds that each is paid and further that
respondent is to pay all taxes owing
pertaining to said property up to the date of
closing of said sale. (R. at 86).
* * *

It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and
DECREED that respondent is to pay the
petitioner the amount of $860.00 per month as
and for maintenance to terminate only upon
petitioner's remarriage or death. (R. at 87).
The house was sold on or about the 30 day of June, 1985
on a Real Estate Contract.

The total purchase price was $68,000.

There were closing costs and fees of $1,559.26. The buyer paid a
down payment of $15,000 and the balance of $53,000 was to bear
interest at 10 percent and was due in full on August 1, 2000. The
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monthly payments were $515.81. (R. at 93-104, copy attached to
Addendum as Exhibit "B").
Defendant/Appellee remarried on or about February 28,
1986 at which time Plaintiff/Appellant's alimony obligation ceased
pursuant to the terms of the Decree.

(R. at 31).

Plaintiff/

Appellant had failed to pay all the alimony payments to the
Defendant/Appellee and the Trial Court found that at the time of
her remarriage he was approximately $50,079.02 in arrears. (T. at
140-141; and trial Exhibit 15, copy attached to Addendum as Exhibit
"C".)
On or about January 28, 1988, Plaintiff/Appellant filed
an Amended Complaint which in relevant part sought payment of the
"net proceeds" from the sale of the home.

(R. at 11).

Appellee counterclaimed for alimony arrearages.
Trial was held on December 17, 1991.

Defendant/

(R. at 25).
(R. at 341). At

the time of trial, Defendant/Appellant offered evidence as to the
present value of the Real Estate Contract as of February 28, 1986
(the date alimony terminated) was $66,389.95, of which Plaintiff/
Appellant

would

$33,192.48.

at

best

be

entitled

to

one-half

(1/2) or

(R. at 352). The alimony arrearages with interest

were $50,079.02 resulting in an amount due Defendant/Appellee of
$16,886.84 as of February 28, 1986. (R. at 352, Exhibit "C"
herein).

The Trial Court noted that Appellee had only brought the

figures current to February of 1986 and that had figures as to the
5

amount due on the date of trial been used, the alimony arrearage
would have been even larger* (T. at 100).
On or about the 6th day of March, 1992, the District
Court issued an Order which in relevant part found that Plaintiff
/Appellant's alimony arrearages as of February 28, 1986 exceeded
the one-half balance owing to him under the Decree by $16,886.54.
The Court offset the Plaintiff/Appellant equity in the property and
awarded Defendant/Appellee a judgment in the amount of $16,886.54.
(R. at

355-358, copy attached

to Addendum

as Exhibit "D").

Plaintiff/Appellant filed this Appeal on or about April
6, 1992, (R. at 361), alleging that he is entitled to have the
future value of the payments under the real estate contract offset
against the present value of his alimony arrearages.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT(S)
The Appellant raised only one issue in his Docketing
Statement; namely the interpretation of the term "proceeds". His
failure to state any other issues in his Docketing Statement is and
abandonment and waiver of those issues.

Such issues, even if

preserved at the Trial Court level can not be raised for the first
time in Appellant's Brief.

Appellant should not be allowed to

argue any error arising from the use of the Washington prejudgment
interest rate or the refusal to allow his alleged expert to testify
as to the meaning to the term "proceeds" as those issued were not
identified in his Docketing Statement.
6

There is no dispute as to the interpretation of the term
"proceeds".

All of the parties and the Trial Court are in

agreement as to what constitutes "proceeds".

Appellant's error

arises from not reducing his future expectancy under the Real
Estate Contract to it's present value. Appellant seeks to offset
the unliquidated, future value of his contract payments against the
liquidated present value of his alimony arrearages. Such a result
is not fair, equitable or has any basis in law or logic.
The Trial Court properly applied the Washington prejudgment rate of interest, as that is the rate provided in the
jurisdiction were the obligation arose.

Appellant has failed to

marshall any of the evidence in support of the Trial Court's
finding on this issue and on that basis alone, this Court show not
review his assignment of error.

See Scharf v. BMG Corp., supra.

ARGUMENT
I
THE APPELLANT IS PROHIBITED FROM ARGUING ANY
ISSUE IN HIS BRIEF WHICH WAS NOT IDENTIFIED IN
HIS DOCKETING STATEMENT,
Plaintiff/Appellant in his Docketing Statement states as
follows:
8.
ISSUE FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF
REVIEW: The issue for this Court's review is
the interpretation of the term in paragraph B
of the Washington Decree of Dissolution which
ordered the division between Appellant and
Appellee of the "proceeds" from the sale of
the home. The Court should determine whether

7

"proceeds" means the amount of the income to
the parties at the time of the sale in June
1985 or whether "proceeds" means the total
amount of money which is to be received by
Appellee during the total time payment period
of payments pursuant to the sale documents*
Although Plaintiff/Appellant only identified the one
issue as to the interpretation of the term "proceeds" from the
parties Decree of Divorce he now seeks to add the issues of whether
the Trial Court committed error in applying the Washington State
statutory prejudgment interest rate of twelve percent (12%) rather
than the Utah rate of ten percent (10%) to his alimony arrearages
and also whether the Trial Court committed error in not allowing
him to call a witness to offer his interpretation of the term
"proceeds".
Appellant should be prohibited from raising additional
issues not previously identified in his Docketing Statement*

The

Docketing Statement required by Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure requires the Appellant to identify the issues
that he wishes to be considered on appeal*

That Rule in relevant

part provides as follows:
(c) The docketing statement shall contain the
following information in the order set forth
below:
* * *

(5)
The issues presented by appeal,
expressed in the terms and circumstances of
the case, but without unnecessary detail. The
questions should not be repetitious. General
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conclusions such as "the judgment of the trial
court is not supported by the law or facts,"
are not acceptable. For each issue appellant
must state the applicable standard of
appellate
review
and
cite
supporting
authority.
The

Docketing

important functions.

Statement

serves

at

least

two

very

First, the statement of issues allows the

Utah Supreme Court to make an informed decision as to whether the
case should be reassigned to the Utah Court of Appeals.

The

Appellant's omission of issues which he latter intends to argue on
appeal

deprives

the

Supreme

determine case assignments.

Court of

information

needed

to

Secondly, the Docketing Statement

informs all parties of the issues that will be presented on appeal
so that they may file any appropriate Requests
Disposition.

for Summary

Under Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure, such Motions must be filed within ten (10) days of the
Docketing Statement.

The omission of issues later raised in

Appellant's Brief prevents the opposing party the opportunity to
file Motions for Summary Disposition on those matters.
Although there is no Utah case law on this point, the
universal weight of authority from those states which have looked
at this issue is that issues omitted from the docketing statement
will not be heard by the Appellate Court.

See Speedie Food Mart,

Inc. v. Taylor, 809 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Mo. Ct. App. E. Dist., Div.
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Three, 1991) and State v. Lucero, 104 N.M. 587, 725 P.2d 266 (N.M.
App. 1986).
The Appellant has not filed an Motion to amend his
Docketing Statement to include the new issues and such failure
prevents him from raising the issues for the first time in his
Brief.

State v. Rael, 668 P.2d 309 (N.M. App. 1983).
This Court should hold that any issues which were not

listed

in Appellant's

Docketing

Statement, are waived and/or

abandoned and not subject to review by this Court.

Such a holding

will be consistent with the spirit, intent and purpose of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
II

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THE
AMOUNT OF APPELLANT'S INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY
AND PROPERLY CALCULATED THE AMOUNT OF THE
OFFSET FOR ALIMONY ARREARAGES.
A.

Definition of the term "proceeds".

Despite Plaintiff/Appellant's allegation, there is really
no issue as to what constitutes the proceeds from the sale of the
house.

Both the parties and the Trial Court recognize that

proceeds were what was received in payments minus costs.

The

Plaintiff/Appellant in his Docketing Statement refers to this as
"net proceeds".

Appellee and the Trial Court granted him credit

for "the entire proceeds" and "all that was received from the
sale". Appellee does not take issue with the authorities cited by
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Appellant, however they do not contradict nor differ from the
Findings, Conclusions or Order of the Trial Court*
Thus, it is not necessary to address the issue of whether
the Trial Court committed error in not allowing Plaintiff's alleged
expert, Mr* Rex Fuhriman, to testify as to the interpretation of
the term "proceeds" since there was no issue as to the proper
interpretation of that phrase* However, even if that was an issue,
Appellant has failed to marshall the evidence in support of the
Trial Courts finding that Mr. Fuhriman1s testimony was irrelevant.
This failure warrants dismissal of the alleged error.
BMG Corp. supra.

Scharf v.

In addition Appellant has not proffered or

alleged what the testimony of Mr. Fuhriman would have been or how
it would have resulted in a different result before the Trial
Court.
The

Trial

Court

in determining

the

amount

of the

"proceeds" which Plaintiff/Appellant was entitled to reduce the
entire unliquidated contract future expectancy to it's present
value.

This procedure was entirely proper and in accordance with

established law as argued below.
B. Appellant is not entitled to use the future value of
his contract interest to offset the present value of his alimony
arrearage.
Plaintiff/Appellant's

argument

is

not

as

to

what

constitutes "proceeds," but rather whether he can use the future
value of his contract interest to offset, and in fact result in a
11

credit against the present value of his alimony arrearages. Thus,
the true issue presented is one of simple accounting and not of a
definition of a legal term of art.

The Plaintiff/Appellant asks

this Court to allow him to use an unliquidated future expectancy to
not only offset, but give him a credit, against a presently
existing judgment for alimony arrearages.
It is clear that the parties and the Washington Court
contemplated that the house would be sold for a lump sum and that
the parties would simply divide that sum minus the inherent costs
and closing fees.

Although it may not have been contemplated by

the parties nor considered by the Court that the property might, as
proved to be the case, be sold on a contract with payments received
over time, it is clear that in such a case, the Court would have
had

to

use

the

present value

of

the

contract

interest

in

apportioning the parties' shares.
As indicated in the statement of facts above, Plaintiff/
Appellant's alimony obligation was $50,079.02. Said amount was to
bear interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%).

Also, the

present value of the Plaintiff/Appellant's contract interest in the
property was only $33,192.48. The contract was to bear interest at
ten percent (10%) as contrasted to the twelve percent (12%) which
the alimony arrearages accrued.

Although the future value of

Plaintiff/Appellant's contract interest as on August 1, 2000, would
be $57,410.47 (1/2 of the total $114,820.94) the future value of
12

his alimony arrearages as of that date would be $266,468.95. Thus,
under Plaintiff/Appellant1s theory of using future value, the
alimony arrearage judgment would be approximately $200,000.
The Plaintiff/Appellant1 s fundamental error is that he is
confusing apples and oranges. He seeks to offset the present value
of his alimony obligation against the future value of his contract
interest.

Utah law is clear that the future expectancy under the

contract must be reduced to its present value.

"The right to

receive monies in the future is unquestionably . . . an economic
resource subject to equitable distribution based upon proper
computation of its present dollar value."
656 P.2d 431

Woodward v. Woodward,

(1982). (Emphasis added).

The Plaintiff/Appellant is entitled to have the present
value of the contract interest offset against the present value of
his alimony arrearage.
ordered in this case.

That is exactly what the Trial Court
The Order in relevant part provided as

follows:
2. That the alimony arrearage that the
plaintiff owed to the defendant as of the date
of the sale of the Logan home, once owned by
the parties, June 30, 1985, was larger than
one-half (1/2) of the net equity which was to
be awarded to the plaintiff as set forth in
page 1, paragraph b of the Decree of
Dissolution.
That as of said date, the
balance owing after one-half (1/2) equity in
the home is deducted for alimony arrearages
was $9,322.83.
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3.
That the alimony arrearages owing
from the plaintiff to the defendant as of
February 28, 1986, the date that alimony
ceased when offset against the equity of the
home and the payments received on the Logan
home left the balance owing to the defendant
after the offset of $16,886.54.
7. At the time of the sale of the house
in 1985, the plaintiff would have been
entitled to a maximum of $33,000, that at
which time he was already in arrears in his
alimony to a sum exceeding that. The best he
could hope for at that point would be that
when the house was sold that he either had
one-half of the proceeds from each of the
monthly installments or had the defendant
elected, she could have paid in the $33,000.
Since he was already in default in excess of
that figure, his interest in the home at that
time was liquidated and he was given credit
for the same against the arrearage leaving a
balance owed to the defendant in the sum of
$16,000. (R. at 356-357).
Thus, the Trial Court actually interpreted the facts in
a light most favorable to the Plaintiff/Appellant.

He was given

full credit for the maximum amount that he could have been entitled
to upon the sale of the house. That sum was insufficient, however,
to completely offset his alimony arrearages and resulted in the
judgment for the surplus of the amount owed.
The Plaintiff/Appellant is not entitled to take the
future value of his contract interest and offset it against the
present value of the alimony arrearage. Present value must be
contrasted against present value, not future value.

If the

Plaintiff/Appellant was intent upon utilizing the future value of
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his contract interest, then the future value of the alimony
arrearage should also be calculated. Since the contract only bears
interest at the rate of ten percent (10%), while the judgment bears
interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%), the disparity on
August 1, 2000 (the date when the contract is finally paid) would
be even larger. Should the Court contrast the future value of the
contract against the future value of the alimony arrearage, the
Plaintiff/Appellant

would

come

out

owing

a

judgment

of

approximately $200,000 rather than the $16,886.54 entered by the
Court.
C. The Trial Court properly calculated the amount of the
alimony arrearages.
It is not disputed that the Appellant was in arrears in
his alimony obligations. Appellant states that at trial he claimed
he was only in arrears in the amount of $33,655.00 (Appellant's
Brief, page 7 and R. at 41). Appellant acknowledges that Appellee
introduced evidence that he had failed to make alimony payments in
the amount of $50,079.02 (which included interest at the rate of
12%).

The Trial Court accepted Appellee's calculation finding

Appellant's calculations "totally unreliable" (T. at 140), and the
only error that Appellant assigns is that the arrearages should
only have borne interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) which is
the Utah prejudgment interest rate, rather than twelve percent
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(12%) as provided by Washington law, the State which entered the
alimony obligation.
It was entirely just and proper to apply the Washington
prejudgment interest rate rather than the Utah rate*

The Trial

Court was reguired to determine the duties and obligations of the
parties under a Washington Decree of Dissolution.
it was entirely proper to apply Washington law*

In such a case,

In any event, the

difference in the interest rate is virtually insignificant*

If the

amount of the Judgment is calculated at ten percent (10%) it would
only be $673*37 less at 10 percent (10%).
This is not a case of first impression in this State.
The Courts of this State have previously ruled on the choice of law
provisions applicable in a domestic relations matter, particularly
as it bears on the guestion of prejudgment interest.

The Utah

conflict of laws rule is that is that substantive legal guestions
are governed by the law of the State were the cause of action
arose. Scott v. Scott, 19 Utah 2d 267, 430 P.2d 580 (1967).
Scott, the Supreme Court stated as follows:
The
right
to
such
accrued
(alimony)
installment payments vested in the plaintiff
upon the due date of each installment, and the
plaintiff is entitled to interest thereon at
the legal rate until payment is made...
Accordingly the lower court was correct in its
holding that it had no power or authority to
change or modify the Nevada judgment as to the
accrued installments of alimony thereunder.
Id. at 583.
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In

However, the Courts of this State have on numerous occasions upheld
the principle of granting full faith and credit to foreign decrees
in divorce cases. See Westerfield v. Coop, 6 Utah 2d 262, 311 P. 2d
787.
In the case of Slade v. Slade, 468 P.2d 627 (N.M. 1970),
the parties were divorced pursuant to a Kansas Decree of Divorce
which required the Defendant to pay child support.

The Defendant

failed to make all of his required payments and subsequently moved
to New Mexico.

Plaintiff filed suit against the Defendant in New

Mexico seeking child support arrearages.

The Defendant alleged

that the Court should apply the New Mexico rate of prejudgment
interest rather than the higher Kansas rate.

The Trial Court

disagreed and entered judgment for arrearages with interest at the
Kansas rate.

On appeal the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld that

determination stating as follows:
The issue raised by the pleadings was the
amount to which plaintiff was entitled under
the Kansas judgment. The theory on which the
case was tried was the legal right of
plaintiff to recover a money judgment based on
her Kansas judgment. Plaintiff was entitled
to interest on the Kansas judgment as a matter
of law, to the same extent that she was
entitled to the monthly payments awarded by
that judgment. Id. at 631.
The cases cited by Appellant are not applicable and are
easily distinguished. Prospero Associates v. Redactron Corp., 682
P.2d

1193

(Colo. App. 1983) is limited to cases where "the
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prejudgment interest is not awarded pursuant to a contractual
provision, but is awarded as an item of damages as a matter of
law" . Id at 1200. Further the Court in that case acknowledged that
"Colorado follows the minority rule that prejudgment interest is
governed by the law of the forum state." (emphasis added). Id. at
1200.
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
The term "proceeds" as it was utilized by the Washington
Court was understood by the trial court as well as the parties.
The Plaintiff/Appellant seeks to contrast apples and oranges. He
cannot be allowed to contrast the future value of the contract
interest against the present value of his alimony obligation. The
Tiral Court was correct in calculating the present value of
Plaintiff/Appellant's interest and giving him full credit for the
maximum amount he would be entitled to. Under any equitable view
of the facts, whether contrasting present value against present
value or future value against future value, the Plaintiff /Appellant
still owes Defendant/Appellee for alimony arrearages which accrue
at a greater rate that the proceeds under the contract.
DATED this

/

day of November, 1992.
HENRIKSEN, HENRIKSEN & CALL, P.C.

OsKicLijJjLjLsuq,
C. RICHARD HENRTIKSEN, J r ^
Attorney for Appellee
"
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foregoing Brief of Appene
iQQ2 to the following:
J__ day of November, 1992
^
^ . ^
Thomas L. Willinore
OLSEN & HOGGAN, P.C.
56 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT A:

Decree of Dissolution.

EXHIBIT B:

Real Estate Contract.

EXHIBIT C;

Calculation of Alimony Arrearages.

EXHIBIT D:

Order of Trial Court (March 9, 1992)
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LOGAN DISTRICT

• II

m3 IHWM

2

OCT 2 01980

3 ||

KING COUNTY SUPERIOR
COURT CLERK'S OrTCE

4

5 II

SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY

6

In Re the Marriage of:

7

GRACE DONOHUE,

8

Petitioner,

9
10

)

NO.

and

80-3-04990-2

DECREE OF DISSOLUTION

THOMAS J, DONOHUE,

XI

c9iU>&l ^

Respondent

12
13

THIS MATTER having come on duly and regularly before the

14

undersigned, one of the judges of the above-entitled court, on the

15

date last shown below, the petitioner being represented by her

16

counselor of law, H. Michael Fields of Anderson & Fields Inc., P.S

17

and respondent having failed to appear, although having been

18

duly and personally served and the court being otherwise fully

19

advised in the premises, having made its Findings of Fact and

20

Conclusions, now, therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the marriage of the

21
22

parties be and is hereby dissolved.

It is further

23

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the wife is awarded as

24

her sole and separate property, free and clear of any interest in

~c

the husband, the following:

26

A. Thirteen acres located located in Logan, Utah;

27 II

B. The home located in Logan,Utah, which home should be

2g

sold and after payment of closing costs and underlying mortgage

29

payment, the proceeds divided equally between petitioner and

3Q it respondent.
<%!

32

Each party should be required to bear any capital

gains that may be occasioned proportionally with the respective
proceeds that each is paid and further that respondent is to pay
Decree of -Dissolution
VCWJ.cc

v/J.

y w a w ^ w w H

- 1

ANDERSON 4 FIELDS INC.. P.S.

*
*t»

fcU

VUU.

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
207 EAST EDGAR STREET
SEATTLE. WASHINGTON Ml02

FILED
APR

|<5
41990

1

all taxes owing, pertaining to said property, up to the date of

2

closing of said sale.

3

C. All personalty in her possession and/or under her

4

respective control, including bank accounts in her name. It is

5

further

6

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that husband is awarded as

•j

his sole and separate property, free and clear of any interest in

g

the wife, the following:

g

A. All personalty in his possession and or under his
respective control, icnluding bank accounts in his name;

10

B. All employment benefits which he may be entitled to
11
1^ J| through his employment;
C. An equal share in the proceeds of the home located in

13

Logan, Utah, on the terms and conditions as heretofore set forth.

14

It is further

15

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that both parties are awarded

16

the joint legal custody of Cody, with the primary residence for

17

Cody being provided by father/respondent,with unlimited rights of

18

visitation awarded to the mother. It is further

19

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that respondent be and is

20

hereby required to absorb the sole financial responsibility for

21

the support of Cody and to pay all college expenses, including

22

room and board,tuition, books, lab fees, and transportation, if

23

Cody enrolls in a post-high school institution of higher learning

24

or vocational institution to terminate at age twenty-two or attain-j

25

ment of a basic degree, whichever is first to occur. It is further!

26

II

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that respondent is to pay

27

to petitioner the amount of $860 per month as and for maintenance

28

to terminate only upon petition^^gemacriage or death.

29 ||

Presented by:

31
32

DONE IN OPEN COURT this

II

of ANDERSON & FIELDS INC., P.i."
Attorneys for Petitioner

day of September, 1980.
JUDGE/COURT COMMISSIONER
ANDERSON & FIELDS INC., P.S.
AHORNCYS AT uw
307 f AST EDOAA ST«F€T

Decree of Dissolution * 2

SRATTU?. WASHINGTON mm

RECEIVED

1

OCT 2 0 1980

2

KING COUNFY SUPLRIOR
COURT CLERK'S Oi»'.t.r.

3
4
5

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY

6

In Re the Marriage of:

7

GRACE DONOHUE,
NO. 80-3-04990-2
Petitioner,

8
9
10

FINDINGS OF FACT &
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

AND
THOMAS J. DONOHUE,
Respondent.

11

12

BE IT REMEMBERED that the above captioned matter came on duljj

13

and regularly for nearing before the undersigned, one of the judges

14

of the above entitled court, on the date last shown below, heard

15

testimony, and deeming itself fully

advised in the premises, now,

16

therefore, the court does make t;he following:

17
18
FINDINGS OF FACT

19

I.

20
21
22

The parties were married on October 4, 1952, in Detroit,
Michigan.

The marriage is registered in Wayne County.
II.

23

At the time the filing of the petition for dissolution the

24
25

petitioner wao a resident of the state of Washington.
III.

26

90 days have elapsed since the service of the petition for

27
28
29
30

31
32

legal separation and the amended petition for dissolution upon the
respondent, who was personally served with copies of said petitions
and subpoenas pertaining thereto.
//
Findings of Fact &
rnnMiuions of Law - 1

ANDERSON & FIELDS INC., P.S.

1 II

IV.

2

There is one child born issue of the marriage of the parties J

3

to wit, Cody T. Donohue, age 15

4

V

5
6

Both parties are fit and proper persons to have the care,
custody and control of the dependent child of the parties

7

VI

g

The parties own:

9 II

1.

13 acres of unimproved property located in Logan;
Utah, legally described as per attachment, and
has an approximate value of $100,000;

2.

A home located in Logan, Utah, which has a net
value after the payment of the underlying encumbrance of approximately $60,000;

3.

Personalty of nominal value in the possession of
each •

4.

Bank accounts of nominal value in cheir individual
names;

5.

Employment benefits through the respondent's
employment of unknown value;

JO ||
w\\
12
11
" "
14
15
16
17

VII.

18

The parties have had six children thtoughout their

19

year marriage, only one of whom is emancipated and concerning whom

20

the petitioner stayed home and gave up career opportunities to

21

rear and take care of.

22

pursuant to his employment would leave the home for periods of up

23

to a year before returning.

In reason years, particularly, the respondent]

VIII.

24
25

29

Respondent currently earns the sum of $5,200 per month as

26

take home pay plus additional per diems through his employment

27

while the petitioner has meager, part time employment and has never

28

earned more than a net of approximately $275 in any given month.
IX.

29
30
31
32

That the marriage is irretrievably broken.
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court does
now make the following:
Findings & Com* l *»«*-••

1

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

2
3

1.

subject matter of this lawsuit;

4 II
5

That the court has Jurisdiction over the parties and

2.

That a Decree of Dissolution should enter dissolving

the marriage of the parties;

^ ||

3.

That the court has the requisition jurisdiction to

7

divide all property owned by the parties located both within and

g

without the State of Washington;

Q

10
11
12
13

4.

That a just and equitable division of the property

and debts of the parties, giving full consideration to all of the
factors that RCW 26.09 et seq., requires the court to consider
and the developing case law pertaining thereto; that a just and
equitable division of the property, particularly considering the
role that petitioner has played as homemaker, length of marriage

14
and provided and rearing of parties six children and further the
15
disparity which exists between the earning capacity of the husband
16
and that of the wife, the court deems the following to be a just
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

and equitable division of the property and obligations of the
parties:
A.

That the wife should be awarded, free and clear

of any interest of husband, except as herein specifically
provided:
1.

13 acres located in Logan, Utah;

2.

The home located in Logan, Utah, which home

should be sold and after payment of closing costs and under-

^

lying mortgage payment, the proceeds divided equally

26 II

between petitioner and respondent.

27

to bear any capital gains that may be occasioned, propor-

28

tionally with the respective proceeds that each is paid

29

and further that respondent should be required to pay all

30

taxes owing, pertaining to said property, up to the date

31

of closing of said sale.

32

Findings & Conclusions

Each should be required

- 3
ANDERSON & FIELDS INC., P.S.

1

3. All personalty in her possession and/or under her

2

control, including bank accounts in her name.

3 II

B. The husband should be awarded as his sole and separate

4

property, free and clear of any interest in the wife, except as

5

herein specifically provided, the following:

6 11
7

1. All personalty in his possession and/or under his
control, icnlduing bank accounts in his name;

g II
g

2. All employment benefits to which he may be entiled
through his employment;
3.

10

11
12
13
14

An equal share in the proceeds of the home located

in Logan, Utah, on the terms and conditions as are heretofore set forth.
5.

That both parties should be awarded the joint, legal

custody of theparties 1 son, Cody, with the primary residence for
Cody to be provided by the father/respondent with unlimited right

15
of visitation awarded to mother.
16
6.

That respondent should be required to absorb the sole

17
financial responsibility for the support of Cody and to pay all
18
college expenses, icnlduing room and board, tuition, books and
19
lab fees in addition to transportation, if Cody enrolls in a post20
21
22
23

high school institution of higher learning or vocational insittution, to terminate at age twenty-two or attainemnt of a basic
degree, whichever is first to occur.
7.

That respondent should pay and petitioner should be

awarded the amount of $860 per month as and for maintenance to

25
26

terminate only upon her remarriage or death.
xhe Court having made its Conclusions of Law, now, there-

27

28 (J

29

30 II

fore let an appropriate Decree of Dissolution be prepared and entered.
OCT 2 0 1980,
DONE IN OPEN COURT t h i s
day of September, 1980.
JUbCE/COURT CdMMiSSttoElR—
Presented by:

31 „
of ANDERSON & FIELDS INC., P.S.
32 ||

Attorneys for Petitioner

ANDERSON A CIC 1

r%«*

««-•-

EXHIBIT B
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into at Logan, Cache* County,
Utah, the 30
day of June, 19B5, by and between GRACE K. DONOHUE,
hereinafter referred to and designated as "Seller", and JEFFRY B.
and MICHELLE S. JACOBSEN, jointly and severally hereinafter
referred to and designated as "Buyer".
W I T N E S S E T H :
1. For the consideration and on the terms and conditions
herein set forth, Seller agrees to sell and Buyer agrees to
purchase that certain real property and improvements thereon
located in Cache County, Utah, and more particularly described as
follows:
All of Lot 15 of Block 2, Mountain View, as shown by
the Plat of said sub-division filed the 26th day of
February, 1959, as filing no* 296424 in the Office of
the Recorder of Cache County, Utah.
2. Buyer aqrees to pay for said real property the principal
sum of $68,000*00, plus interest at the rate of ten (10%) percent
per annum, both principal and interest payable in lawful money of
the United States of America, strictly within the following times:
(a) $1,000.00 cash down prior to Buyer taking possession of the premises on June 15, 1985i
(b) $14,000.00 cash down upon the execution and
delivery of this Agreement on or before July 1, 1985j
(c) The balance of the purchase price in the amount
of $53,000,00, plus interest at the rate of ten percent per annum shall be evidenced by a promissory
note a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A"*
Said promissory note and the terms and conditions
thereof are hereby made a part of this Agreement by
reference.
(d) The balance of the purchase price of $53,000.00
together with interest from the 1st day of July, 1985,
at'the rate of ten (10%) percent per annum on the
unpaid principal shall be payable as follows:

(1) $48,000.00 together with 6aid interest therec
in monthly payments of $515.81 on August 1, 1985r wit
a like payment due on the first day of each month
thereafter until August 1, 2000, on which day the
unpaid balance of this contract together with accrued
interest thereon are due and payable and shall be pai
In full.
(2) An additional payment of $5,250.00 shall be
made on January 1, 1986. The $5,000.00 amount shall
be applied to the principal amount and the $250.00
amount shall be applied to six months of interest
accrued on $5,000.00.
(e) The aforementioned monthly installments shall
be applied first to the payment of interest, and
second, to the reduction of the principal amount
of the purchase price. Buyer shall have the right
to prepay any and all amounts set forth herein.
3. The closing of this transaction shall occur on or befoi
July 1, 1985, or as soon thereafter as possible. The closing oi
this transaction shall take place at the office of Harris,
Preston, Gutke 4 Chambers, Logan, Utah, or such other place
designated by agreement of the parties hereto.
At the closing, Buyer and Seller shall deposit in cash <
by certified check all funds required of it to be paid at the
closing and Seller shall deliver good and sufficient executed
instruments and documents necessary to transfer and convey title
to the property and otherwise carry out the purpose and intent ol
this Agreement. Said instruments and documents to be executed an
delivered by Seller include, but are not limited to, the followln
(a)

This Agreement;

(b) Warranty Deed conveying subject property from
Seller to Buyer.
Buyer shall execute and deliver to the closing agent the
following instruments and documents:
(a)

This Agreement*

(b)

Promissory Note and Deed of Trust.

4. Possession of said premises shall be delivered to Buyer
on June 15, 1985.

5. Buyer agrees at all* times during the term of this
Agreement and Trust Deed and until the purchase price is paid in
fullf to keep all insurable improvements on said property insured
against fire and general hazards for an amount not less than the
total unpaid balance under this contract. Said insurance shall be
written with a reputable insurance company in the name of Buyer
with a mortgage clause in favor of Seller insuring her interests.
6. Within ten (10) days after the execution and delivery of
this Agreement and the warranty deed and Deed of Trust referred to
in paragraph 3, Seller agrees to provide Buyer with an owner's
policy of title insurance from a qualified title insurer of her
choice on the real property subject of this Agreement, insuring
said property against all liens and encumbrances, except the standard exceptions in policies of title insurance issued by American
Title Insurance Company, except easements of record, the exceptions provided in this Agreement, and except the Trust Deed from
Buyer to Seller. The premium for said policy shall be paid by
Seller.
7. In the event there are anv liens or encumbrances against
said property other than those herein provided for or referred to,
or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against the same by acts or
neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at its option, pay and
discharge the same and receive credit on the amount then remaining
due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and
therafter the payments herein provided to be made, may, at the
option of the Buyer, be suspended until such time as such
suspended payments shall equal any sums advanced as aforesaid.
8.

It Is agreed that time is the essence of this Agreement.

9. A, Buyer agrees to make all payments under this
Agreement, Promissory Note and Trust Deed to Logan Savings 6
Loan Association of Logan, Utah, unless otherwise directed by
notice signed by Seller or noted hereon. Upon Buyer's
failure to comply with the terms and conditions of this
Agreement Logan Savings & Loan Association is hereby
directed to notify Seller of such failure to comply.
B. It is agreed that in case Logan Savings & Loan
Association sees fit to notify the Buyer that payments are
due hereunder, or past due, that said actions are done only
for the convenience of the parties and that Logan Savings *
Loan Association has no obligation to give said notice, nor
shall the giving of said notice by Logan Savings & Loan
Association create any liability on its part.

C. It is understood by the parties that Logan Savings
6 Loan Association does not quarantee to collect any payment
provided in this contractf or pay the taxes on the property
or to insure the 6ame and shall not be responsible or liable
for any damage to 6aid property.
10* Concurrent with the execution and delivery of this
Agreementf Seller agrees to execute, acknowledge and deliver to
Buyer a warranty deed conveying title to said real property, and
Buyer agrees to execute, acknowledge and deliver to Seller a Promissory Note and a Deed of Trust on the real property subject of
this Agreement to Logan Savings & Loan Association as Trustee for
Seller as beneficiary to secure the Promissory Note referred to in
paragraph 2(b).
11. Seller represents that all real property taxes and
assessments on said premises are paid through December 31, 1984
and Buyer agrees to pay all real property taxes and all assessmenti
of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed or
levied against said real property for the 1985 year. However,
Seller shall reimburse Buyer for real property taxes and all
assessments of every kind which are assessed against said property, from January 1, 1985 to June 14, 1985. Said reimbursement
shall be made to Buyer within 15 days of the date Buyer pays the
1985 real property taxes and assessments. If Seller does not make
the above stated payment within 15 days of the date the 1985 real
property taxes and assessments are paid then Buyer is entitled to
set off the amount* Buyer owes Seller from any monthly payment or
payments made under this contract.
12. In the event of failure to comply with the terms hereof
by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make any payment
when the same shall become due, or within 30 days thereafter the
Seller, at her option shall have the following alternative
remedies:
A. Seller shall have the right upon failure of the
Buyer to remedy the default within fifteen days after written
notice, to be released from all obligations in law and in
equity to convey said property, and all payments which have
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be
forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for the nonperformance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the
Seller may at her option re-enter and take possession of said
premises without legal process, as in its first and former
estate, together with all improvements and additions made by
the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements
shall remain with the land to become the property of the
Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the
Selleri or

D. The Seller mav bring suit and recover judgment for
all delinquent installments, including costs and attorney's
fees. (The U6e of this remedy on one or more occasions shall
not prevent the Seller, at her option, from resorting to one
of the other remedies hereunder, in the event of a subsequent
default)) or
C. The Seller shall have the right, at her option, and
upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire
unpaid balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may
elect to treat this contract as a note and mortgage, and pass
title to the Buyer subject thereto, proceed immediately to
close the same in accordance with the laws of the State of
Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to
the payment of the balance owing, including costs and
attorney's fees; and the Seller may have a judqment for any
deficiency which may remain. In the case of foreclosure, the
Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be
immediately entitled to the appointment of a receiver to take
possession of said mortgaged property and collect the rents,
issues and profits therefrom and apply the same to the
payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant to order of the court? and the Seller upon entry of
judgment of foreclosure shall be entitled to possession of
said premises during the period of redemption.
13. Seller and Buyer agree that each is to pay their own
attorney1s fees for the preparation of this Agreement and one-half
of all fees and charges of Logan Savings & Loan Association for
conducting the services referred to in paragraph 9 of this
Agreement*
14. It is expressly understood between Buyer and Seller that
this contract and the documents referred to herein have been prepared by Harris, Preston, Gutke h Chambers, attorneys at law; that
Harris, Preston, Gutke 4 Chambers have been retained as attorneys
to prepare this contract at the insistance and request of Buyer
and in so doing, Harris, Preston, Gutke t Chambers are not acting
as attorneys for Seller. Seller acknowledges that she has had
explained to her her right to retain independent legal counsel
or such other advice as they may deem in their best interests to
review this Agreement and the terms, provisions and conditions
thereof, and that this contract is entered into between Buyer and
Seller after having received such advice and counsel and after
having made such examination and having sought such advice and
counsel as they deem in their respective best interests.
15. This Agreement and the Warranty Deed, Promissory Note and
Trust Deed referred to herein constitutes the entire agreement of
the parties. All negotiations, representations, warranties and

other agreements between the parties are merged herein. Buyer
accepts the property subject to this Agreement in its condition
of the date hereof and there are no representations as to the
condition of said property and the improvements thereon other U
as set forth in this Agreement.
16.
include
include
include
text so

As used in this Agreement, the term "Seller" shall
all sellers, whether one or more* the term •'Buyer'1 shall
all buyers, whether one or morei and the masculine shall
the feminine and the feminine the masculine when the con*
requires.

17. The terms of this Agreement shall be binding upon and
shall inure to the benefits of the parties hereto, their respective heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns.
18. That Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default
in any of the covenants or agreements contained herein the
defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a
reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from
enforcing this Agreement or in obtaining possession of the
premises covered hereby or in pursing any remedy provided
hereunder or by the laws of the State of Utah, whether such remedy
is pursued by filing a suit or otherwise.
19. There is no real estate commission due any party as a
result of this transaction.
20. All notices given under this contract shall be sent to
Buyer, Seller and the escrow holder.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their hands
on the day and first above written.
SELLER:
"TVy^f tr 'J*— A" * / { ^

Grace K. Donohue

Miche

~? *~«*Xo<S~£—

STATE QF WASHINGTON

)

County of King

)

! SS

On the 3c? day of \"Z?<ng— # 1985, personally appeared before
me, Grace K. Donohue, the signer of the within instrument, who
duly acknowledged to me that she
the same.
sameie executed
executed the
•?
i i 7,
Commission expires: „ ' ' * 1 ,r
^
Residing at: ^,V.. CVv^ZL
flWuw-£r>-~
STATE OF UTAH
County of Cache

Notary Public

)
: ss
)

On the f}— day of ( t , A * , 1985, personally appeared before m e
Jeffry B. Jacobsen and JttichFlle S. Jacobsen, the signers of the
within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that —they executed
the same.

(^_ yy^iu
Commission expires:
Residing at:

Pjttj^l

/7d

CLOSING STATEMENT
SELLERi
BUYERS:

Grace K. Donohue
Jeffry B. and Michelle S. Jacobsen
Prepared byi
Harris, Preston, Gutke & Chambers
Attorneys at Law
31 Federal Avenue
Loqanf Utah 84321
(801) 752-3551

SETTLEMENT STATEMENT
********************

Prorations:
Property Taxes ( ) Actual
(XJ Prev. Years $447.41
1/1/85
Beginninq Year:
Possession/Proration Date:
6/15/85
Amount to be prorated*

$

203.76

Total Closinq or Settlement Fee
Escrow Fee for Servicing

$

75.00

Selling/Purchase Price
Down Payment

$68,000.00
$ 1,000.00

First Mortgage or Contract
Second Mortgage or Contract
Third Mortgage or Contract

$53,000.00

Title Insurance
Seller's Recording costs
Buyerfs Recording costs

$
$
$

307.00
11.00
5.00

*

*

t t t

ffjff«?iw4'""

*».r,£,le»

**

°"*xplr5i T neurar, oe p r . m l
°ther, ? £ j p r a n c e
PrtmunBmFi^
fIden
Pre
Down *
tlfv,
">iun,s-other
Payrne

«ei?

"t

«.SS?»
*«8»000.

"

^cordi„gSUran«

Property
Pr

Tajt

„

*

37. 5 0

or

° r a t l o n Date

° t h e " (Mentlfy...e w e r
»tf»'orney.
Escrow
A
£ / p« . .! e t c '. ,

*

203

-'«

e

*********

JOWLS*

COMMENTS,

«

***•"

....„„

*««'00?:^

**"»«....

*

a?:???;??.

BUYERS ITEMS

DEBITS

CREDITS

Purchase Price
$68,000.00
Reserves:
Unexpired Ins. Premiums-Fire
Unexpired Ins. Premiums-Other
Other* (Identify)
Attorney^ Fee
Document Preparation
Titlet
Abstract Continuation
Title Insurance
Recording
Other: (Identify)
Survey
Closing or Settlement Fee

$

5.00

$

37.50

Propertv Tax Proration
to the Date of Possession
or Proration Date

203.76

Down Payment
Real Estate Commission

$

First Mortgage or contract
Second Mortgage or Contract
Third Mortgage or Contract
Interest on First Prorated
Interest on Second Prorated
Interest on Third Prorated

$ 53,000.00

1,000.00

Other: (Identify-Sewer, Escrow Fee, Etc.)
«**«**««« * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

TOTALS:

$68,042.50

$ 54,203.76

*****************************************************************

Balance Due from Buyer:
Balancing Totals:

$68,042.50

$ 13,838.74
$ 68,042.50

*****************************************************************

COMMENTS:

«***44*«*44*«*«*«««+***44«******

Balance Due from Buyer:
Balance Due to Seller:
Difference!
Itemization:
Title Insurance
Closing or Settlement Fee
Recording
Attorney Fee Doc. Prep,
Real Estate Commission
Other (Identify):
SUB-TOTAL*
CHECKING TOTAL:

LAW o r r i c c f t o r

LOGAN DISTRICT

HENRIKSEN. HENRIKSEN 8 CALL
C, AICHAAD H C N B I H f t t N , J » .
JOHN W. CALL
D A V . O w. PARKCR

A ^HOfKIHONAL CO**0*ATlON
j f Q | Q U T H BOO C A I T
. A . - . A . , . . ^ . . * w . . T I N *.*•*»%
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102
TELEPHONE (SOI) ftfl-4140

#
W *

Q
*

| ^ f t « DM • ( M l
"»
c5TcOUNlCL
C
' * • HENRIKSEN

March 30, 1990

Thomas L. Willmore, Esq.
P. 0. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321
Attention: Pat
Re:

Donahue v. Parish
Civil No. 87-0026212DC

Dear Pat:
Enclosed are copies of Exhibit M E" andH F M which we failed
to include with our Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion to
Dismiss and/or Summary Judgment. Please accept our apology for any
inconvenience this may have caused.
Sincerely,

Julie Hempel
Secretary
JH/s
Enclosure
cc: Cache County Clerk
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EXHIBIT C
COMPUTATION OF INTEREST DUE ON ALIMONY ARREARAGE
AS OF JUNE 30, 1985
t-M-m,
56
55
54
53
52
51
50
49
48
47
46
45
44
43
42
41
40
39
38
37
36
35
34
33
32
31
30
29
28
27
26
25
24
23
22
21
20
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10

SUJU^

AXJMONY

Oct. 19g0
$860
Nov.
860
Dec.
860
Jan. i98i
860
Feb.
860
March 20
860
April 20
860
May
860
June
860
July
860
August
860
September
860
October
860
November
860
December
860
January i 9 8 2
860
February
860
March
860
April
860
May
860
June
860
July
860
860
August
860
September
860
October
860
November
860
December
860
January igQ3
860
February
860
March
860
April
860
May
860
June
860
July
860
August
860
September
860
860
October
860
November
860
December
860
January i 9 8 4
860
February
860
March
April
860
May
860
June
860
July
860
August

ALIMONY
-£AID_
-0-0-0-0-0860
860
1250
1000
1250
740
-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0400
800
-0-0-0-0-0-0500
-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-

-o-o-0200
800

ALIMONY

-IZMEAJJ2
$860
860
860
860
860
-0-0(390)
(140)
(390)
120
860
860
860
860
860
660
860
860
860
860
860
860
860
460
60
860
860
860
860
860
860
360
860
860
860
860
860
860
860
860
860
860
860
860
660
60

INTERESJ
$481.60
473.00
464.40
455.80
447.20
0.00
0.00
(191.10)
(67.20)
(183.30)
55.20
387.00
378.40
369.80
361.20
352.60
344.00
335.40
326.80
318.20
309.60
301.00
292.40
283.80
147.20
18.69
258.00
249.40
240.80
232.20
223.60
215.00
120.00
197.80
189.20
180.60
172.00
163.40
154.80
146.20
137.60
129.00
120.40
111.80
103.20
72.60
6.00

9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
•—

September
October
November
December
January 1985
February
March
April
May
June

A

_2M

49,020

16,360

(12.60)
4.80
4.20
3.60
3.00
2.40
1.80
(16.80)
8.60
Q^Si.

(140)
60
60
60
60
60
60
(840)
-0660

1000
800
800
800
800
800
800
1700
-0-

860
860
860
860
860
860
860
860
860
860

32,660

$9,,884.20

TOTAL DUE TO GRACE PARISH WITH INTEREST
JUNE 1985

$42, , 544.20

1/2 EQUITY IN HOME

zZL ,220,39
9,,323.83

BALANCE AFTER OFFSET
AS OF FEBRUARY 28, 1986
merest on $42,544.2C) 6/30/85 to 2/28/86

)? M0,
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
rAL

DUE DATE
July 1985
Aug. 1985
Sept. 1985
Oct. 1985
NOV. 1985
Dec. 1985
Jan. 1986
Feb. 1986

$3 ,403.54

ALIMONY

ALIMONY

1/2 INT.

PVE

PAIP

IN HQVSE

860
860
860
860
860
860
860
860

600
200
-0-0-0-0-0-0-

257.91
257.91
257.91
257.91
257.91
257.91
257.91
257.91

2.09
402.09
602.09
602.09
602.09
602.09
602.09
602.09

6880

800

2,063.28

4,016.72

TOTAL DUE^/28/86

INTEREST
$

.14
24.12
30.10
24.08
18.06
12.04
6.02

o.oo
114.56

$50',079.02

1/2 EQUITY IN HOME
(CONTRACT BALANCE $47,694.21
CASH
13,440.74)
61,134.95 divi
BALANCE AFTER OFFSET

ALIMONY
UNPAID

526o

u,m<i5-->-

?33P?W
by-2

EXHIBIT

D

LOGAN DISTRICT

FEB 27
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C. RICHARD HENRIKSEN, JR. #1466
Of HENRIKSEN, HENRIKSEN & CALL, P.C.
Attorney for Defendant
320 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 521-4145
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THOMAS DONAHUE,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

v.

Civil NO. 870026212 DC

GRACE (DONAHUE) PARISH,

Judge Gordon J. Low

Defendant.
This matter came on for trial on December 17, 1991, before
the Honorable Gordon J. Low, District Judge presiding.
The
Defendant was present and represented by C. Richard Henriksen, Jr.,
and the Plaintiff was present and represented by Thomas L.
Willmore. That prior to the commencement of the proceedings, both
parties waived any objections they may have to having the Honorable
Gordon J. Low, District Judge, preside at these proceedings,
including the fact that the Court had previously represented the
Plaintiff as his attorney some years ago.
That the Plaintiff was called and testified, and the
Defendant was called and testified, and various exhibits were
offered and received by the Court, and after the argument of
counsel and after due deliberation, the Court hereby
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FINDS as follows:
1»
That the interest rate 12% per annum shall apply to
all alimony arrearage that the Plaintiff owed the Defendant in this
case pursuant to either Utah law or Washington law.
2.
That the alimony arrearage that the Plaintiff owed
to the Defendant as of the date of the sale of the Logan home, once
owned by the parties, June 30, 1985, was larger than the one-half
(h) of the net equity which was to be awarded to the Plaintiff as
set forth in Page 1, Paragraph B of the Decree of Dissolution*
That as of said date, the balance owing after the one-half (h)
equity in the home is deducted for alimony arrearages was
$9,322.83.
3.
That the alimony arrearages owing from the Plaintiff
to the Defendant as of February 28, 1986, the date that alimony
payments ceased when offset against the equity of the home and the
payments received on the Logan home, left a balance owing to the
Defendant after the offset of $16,886.54.
4.
That if the alimony arrearages were to be calculated
against the offset in the equity in the home up to the date of
trial, December 17, 1991, the amount of the alimony arrearage would
be in excess of $16,886.54.
5.
The Court finds that one-half of the sale proceeds
from the Logan home was to be split evenly between the Plaintiff
and Defendant pursuant to Page 1, Paragraph B of the Decree of
Dissolution and was not done at the time.
6.
The Court finds that the alimony ordered by the
Decree of Dissolution was not paid as set forth in Exhibit 15.
1.
At the time of the sale of the house in 1985 the
Plaintiff would have been entitled to a maximum of $33,000.00, but
at which time he was already in arrears in his alimony to a sum
exceeding that. The best that he could hope for at that point
2

would be that when the house was sold that he either had one-half
of the proceeds from each of the monthly installments or had the
Defendant elected she could have paid in the $33,000.00. Since he
was already in default in excess of that figure, his interest in
the home at that time was liquidated and he was given credit for
the same against the arrearages leaving a balance owed to the
Defendant in the sum of $16,000.00.
8.
The Court finds that all interest of the Plaintiff
is vitiated in the Logan home and all interest or equity in said
home is completely and entirely owned by the Defendant.
9.
The Court finds that Exhibit 15 setting forth the
calculations as to the amount of alimony paid with interest and
the offsets is accurate. The Court finds that at least the sum of
$16,886.54 is owing by the Plaintiff to the Defendant.
10. The Court finds that the alimony did not abate
pursuant to an alleged agreement by the Plaintiff with the
Defendant for the reason that the Court is not convinced that any
agreement took place, nor was there any Court Order granting such
a modification or abatement. The Court also finds that equity does
not justify any abatement for the Plaintiff.
11. The Court finds that there were attorney's fees
expended by the Defendant in the defense and prosecution of this
matter. However, there was not sufficient evidence to establish
bad faith or the fact that the Plaintiff had filed his nonmeritorious case and thus, no attorney's fees are awarded.
After making said findings the Court
CONCLUDES, ORDERS AND DECREES as follows:
1.
That all right to the interest, equity, or claim
Plaintiff has in the equity in the Logan home once owned by the
parties, and sold June 30, 1985, is vitiated.
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2.
That Defendant is awarded judgment against Plaintiff
in the amount of $16,886.54, with interest from date of entry at
12%.
3.
Each party is to bear their own attorney's fees and

DATED this
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BY THE COURT

ict Court Judge

CERTIFICATE QF MAILING

Up day of February,
I hereby certify that on this
1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was mailed,
postage prepaid, to the following individual:
Thomas L. Willmore
Attorney at Law
P. 0. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321
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